This paper examines the information content of firm ratings. We disentangle the relative contribution to firms' ratings of sovereign risks and of the individual firms' performance indicators employed by rating agencies. We reach three conclusions. First, the contribution of sovereign risk to firm ratings is high in developing countries but is negligible in developed countries. Second, even after controlling for the "country ceiling effect" (i.e., the constraint put on the private firms' rating by the rating of the country in which the firms operate), the information content of ratings for firms in developing countries is much smaller than for firms in developed countries. Third, cross-country indicators of information quality help explain these discrepancies, but they do not entirely account for them.
Introduction
Credit-rating agencies are an integral part of modern capital markets. Their assessments of sovereign and corporate entities are increasingly used as benchmarks by regulators and investors. 1 The three major world players in the rating industry are Moody's, Standard and Poor's (S&P's), and Fitch-Intervest Bancshares Corporation. These ªrms originated in the United States but became global ªrms following the rapid integration and growth of international ªnancial markets. 2 But do these global credit-rating agencies really think globally? In other words, do they provide the capital markets with high-quality information on borrowers in both developed and emerging economies?
This question has become particularly pertinent in the aftermath of the harsh criticism of rating agencies since the East Asian ªnancial crisis. Moreover, an analysis of the ability of the credit-rating industry to assess ªrms in less-developed countries (LDCs) is important because the worldwide inºuence of the industry is expected to expand further as a result of the new Basel criteria that link banks' capital asset requirements to the external ratings of corporate and sovereign entities (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2001). Rating agencies have been criticized for their pro-cyclical rating behavior, which may have exacerbated the massive capital outºows during the recent Asian ªnancial crisis. Given the considerable inºuence rating agencies wield in ªnancial markets, their rating behavior and methodologies have come under close scrutiny (e.g., IMF 1999). Studies of rating agencies' assignment of sovereign ratings have been extensive, 3 but our understanding of how credit-rating agencies rate ªrms differently around the world is very limited.
Cursory evidence and some research ªndings (e.g., Ferri, Liu, and Majnoni 2001) indicate that the rating criteria used for ªrms in LDCs differ from the criteria reserved for ªrms in developed countries, but the reasons for this difference have not been adequately explored. Speciªcally, when a sovereign rating is downgraded for a developing country, ªrms' ratings in that country will also tend to be downgraded. The correlation is very high (close to 0.7 for industrial ªrms in LDCs), whereas little correlation is seen between the ratings of ªrms in developed countries and their corresponding sovereign ratings. This rating behavior (if true) puts ªrms in LDCs in a disadvantaged position whenever their sovereign ratings experience a downgrading, particularly if such downward adjustments are excessive with respect to the evolution of the country's underlying fundamentals or to economic indicators during a downturn of the economy. 4 This paper focuses on whether rating agencies dis-tinguish ªrm-speciªc credit risks from the corresponding sovereign risks for ªrms in LDCs.
To address this question we examine the contribution of ªrm-speciªc information to the assignment of each ªrm's rating, in addition to the contribution of the ªrm's corresponding sovereign rating. The "revealed" importance of ªrm-level information, as measured by the weights of the qualitative and quantitative rating criteria, is compared with the weight of the ªrm's sovereign rating. A major difference emerges between developed and developing countries in terms of such weights, and the underlying causes of this difference are carefully scrutinized. We investigate the relationship between the level of information disclosure and the importance of ªrm-level information in assigning ªrm ratings. We also assess the ability of rating agencies to reduce information asymmetry under different market environments.
We compile a comprehensive database that includes the following factors for each ªrm: (1) the credit rating, (2) the value of the risk indicators reportedly used by rating agencies to assign the ªrm's rating, and (3) the sovereign rating. The database covers 1997, 1998, and 1999 . We also complement our database with the widely used law and ªnance indicators proposed by La Porta et al. (1998) and with the information quality indicator recently proposed by Chan- Lee and Ahn (2001) . With regard to information quality, we make the following two observations. First, public information on individual ªrms may be harder to acquire in countries with underdeveloped (and thus more opaque) ªnancial markets, compared with the easily accessible public information of more-developed ªnancial markets. Second, when additional information about an individual ªrm's risks is disclosed by rating agencies, such information will likely be of more value the more opaque the market is in which the ªrm operates.
The main ªndings of this paper are as follows. First, sovereign risks are the major factors in determining the ratings of ªrms in LDCs, whereas such risks play a negligible role in assigning ratings to ªrms in developed countries. Second, ªrm-speciªc information (so-called idiosyncratic information) is largely irrelevant in ratings of corporations in LDCs, even after controlling for the "country ceiling effect" (i.e., when the upper bound of a private rating is determined by the sovereign rating). Accordingly, we show that the information content of ratings for ªrms in LDCs is much smaller than for ªrms in developed countries. Third, we ªnd that cross-country indicators of information quality and of rule of law help account for this unsatisfactory situation of ªrm ratings in LDCs but do not explain it entirely.
2. Firm-level rating methodology of global credit-rating agencies 2.1 General principles A ªrm's desire to obtain a credit rating is often motivated by its need to issue debtrelated instruments in capital markets. The rating is necessary because potential creditors such as banks and institutional investors frequently rely on external ratings as an objective yardstick for the borrower's credit and default risks. In addition, if a ªrm is incorporated outside of the United States, the European Union, or Japan, then fundraising in these markets requires the ªrm to obtain a credit rating by a global credit-rating agency (GCRA).
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The process of obtaining a credit rating on a particular bond issue usually starts with a request from the ªrm. 6 After signing a letter of rating agreement, a series of meetings between the issuer and the rating agency ensues. The standard time needed to assign the rating is about 6 to 12 weeks for both S&P's and Moody's, but the time could be reduced if there is an urgent market need. Fees charged to the issuer vary with the nature of the issues or issuers and with the time needed to determine the rating. Credit-rating agencies will ensure conªdentiality if sensitive information is provided. In such a case, rating agencies have better information than other market participants. Such ratings will better reºect the ªrm's ability to honor its debt obligations. In most cases, however, credit-rating assignments are mainly based on publicly available information.
7 Table 1 summarizes corporate rating criteria published by S&P's and Moody's. Credit-rating criteria often encompass both qualitative and quantitative indicators. Qualitative indicators include (1) to what sector the ªrm belongs, (2) whether it is a capital-intensive ªrm, (3) the degree of competition within the sector and the ªrm's position within its industry, (4) the ªrm's ownership structure, and (5) other indica-tors pertaining to the ªrm's commitment to timely payments of its debt obligations. In recent years, corporate governance practices have also become important criteria. These qualitative indicators often involve some subjective judgments by analysts. For example, management quality is considered an important element in determining a ªrm's ability to honor its future debt obligations, but it is difªcult to quantify. It will be up to the analysts to evaluate by asking managers about their risk proªles, strategies, and management philosophy. If such information is not available, however, a ªrm's track record of ªnancial performance, such as accounting ratios, would function as a proxy of management quality.
Obviously, a ªrm's ability to honor its debt can be best assessed quantitatively from its income statements, balance sheets, and relevant ªnancial performance ratios. The most widely used performance ratio is the cash ºow coverage ratio of the ªrm, which measures whether the ªrm can generate enough cash to meet its debt repayment on time (Moody's 2000) . A second common performance indicator is the degree to which the ªrm has overextended itself, for example, the debt leverage ratio (debt/equity), which often reºects the ªrm's capital structure and level of asset protection. A group of ªnancial indicators, consisting of returns on equity, on assets, or on the ªrm's permanent capital, is considered as well. These sets of indicators are proxies of the ªrm's management quality. In addition, credit-rating agencies frequently look at the size of the rated companies (Standard and Poor's 2000a). Finally, other ªnancial risks, such as whether the ªrm can withstand business cycles, are 
Financial ºexibility
Considerations related to legal problems, insurance coverage, restrictive covenants in loan agreements, or obligations to afªliated entities also considered. Such stress tests, however, are not based on true forecasts of the ªrm's future performance. Rather, they are generally based on the ªrm's past performance, as revealed by its 3-to 5-year ªnancial statements. Table 2 reports the main ªnancial indicators (cash ºows, capital structure, proªtability, and ªnancial ºexibility) for a group of 967 average U.S.-based ªrms, broken down by rating category. Several distinct features stand out prominently. First, the higher is a ªrm's rating, the higher are its interest rate coverage ratios (EBIT and EBITDA interest coverage), 8 as well as its total fund ºows (as a percentage of total debt) and its free operating cash ºows (as a percentage of total debt). Thus, the ªrm's cash ºow and other liquidity indicators are very important determinants of the ªrm's rating. Second, highly rated ªrms tend to have superior returns on capital and enjoy better operating efªciency. Third, and not surprisingly, ratings are negatively related to ªrms' leverage ratios, either their long-term debt or their gross total debt as a percentage of capital. Indeed, as ratings fall below BBB (the borderline between investment grades and speculative grades), the ªnancial ratios also deteriorate markedly, and this deterioration is especially pronounced in the interest coverage ratios, proªtability, and leverage ratios, and in the fund ºows as a percentage of total debt.
The geographical location of the ªrm plays a very important role in its rating assignment. This is because of the commonly held belief (but not yet well-documented phenomenon) that macroeconomic cycles are more vicious in LDCs than in developed countries (DCs). Firms in LDCs are presumed to suffer directly from such macroeconomic shocks, irrespective of the capabilities of their management and operations. This is especially true when countries are going through a current-accountcum-ªnancial crisis or are experiencing political instability and civil strife. This is perhaps why the sovereign rating normally "caps" or deªnes a ceiling for local ªrms; that is, it limits the rating given to local ªrms in LDCs.
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Similar to rating criteria for ªrms, sovereign-rating criteria include both qualitative and quantitative aspects of evaluation. 10 The sovereign rating not only takes into account the country's tangible ability to pay back its debt obligations but also offers an implicit evaluation of the country's institutional quality, such as its rule of law, political stability, and general commitment to carry out rule-based capital market transactions.
Ratings of ªrms in less-developed countries
The practice of limiting the credit rating of a ªrm in a less-developed country to the rating of the country in which the ªrm operates has some unpleasant side effects. As Ferri, Liu, and Majnoni (2001) demonstrate, a downgrade in the sovereign rating tends to trigger a downgrade in the ªrm rating. This linkage, however, is asymmetric: ªrm downgrades generally follow sovereign downgrades, whereas sovereign upgrades do not necessarily lead (as quickly) to ªrm upgrades. Figures 1-4 show this asymmetry for the period of the East Asian crisis and its aftermath: sovereign downgrades were associated with ªrm downgrades, but sovereign upgrades did not always lead (as quickly) to ªrm upgrades.
Figures 1 and 2 show the changes in the sovereign ratings and the changes in the non-bank ratings of corporations in 21 countries during 1996-98. In ªgure 1, which is based on Moody's data for a large set of countries, the yearly minimum sovereign ratings in 1996 (pre-crisis) are plotted against the yearly minimum sovereign ratings in 1998 (peak of the crisis). 11 Figure 1 is divided into different regions by three lines.
The diagonal line represents the points at which the sovereign ratings of 1996 equal those of 1998. The points below this diagonal line represent the countries whose rat- ings declined from 1996 to 1998, and the points above this line represent countries whose ratings improved from 1996 to 1998. The vertical (horizontal) dotted line separates those countries with below-investment-grade ratings from those with aboveinvestment-grade ratings for 1996 (1998). These horizontal and vertical lines also divide the graph into four quadrants. Points in the northeast (southwest) quadrant identify countries holding above-investment-grade (below-investment-grade) ratings in both 1996 and 1998. Points in the southeast (northwest) quadrant identify countries with above-investment-grade (below-investment-grade) ratings in 1996 whose ratings switched to below investment grade (above investment grade) in 1998. Figure 1 highlights the downgrades experienced by Brazil, India, and Venezuela during 1996-98. The sharpest downgrades, however, are for the East Asian crisis countries: Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand fall below investment grade, and Malaysia comes close to the threshold. Figure 2 shows that corporate ratings closely follow this pattern. The sharpest decline in non-bank ratings is for Indonesian corporations, and the average corporate non-bank rating in South Korea and Thailand also falls to below investment grade. 12 Figure 3 shows that the South Korean and
Thai sovereign ratings recover and return to investment grade in 1999, but ªgure 4 indicates that this recovery in ratings does not materialize (as quickly) for South Korean and Thai corporations, because by 1999 such ªrms are still rated as speculative grade.
Such unsatisfactory rating behaviors have serious consequences. Too tight a link between ªrm and sovereign ratings will make it difªcult for investors to distinguish country risks from idiosyncratic credit risks of ªrms in emerging markets. Poor information disclosure at the ªrm level is frequently cited by GCRAs as the reason for using the sovereign rating as the benchmark for the corporate rating. If investors are unable to disentangle such risks, then they tend to shun all sectors of the country. This is perhaps one of the reasons behind the herding behavior of international capital ºows to LDCs.
Rating agencies have also realized that the tight bond between ªrm and sovereign ratings tends to impose constraints on the accurate pricing of risks. As an alternative rating system, domestic-currency ratings and national rating scales were introduced. The meaning of the domestic-currency rating scale, however, is not quite the same as that of the global rating scales of the GCRAs, which in practice indicate the likelihood of default. Moreover, domestic-currency ratings have not had a long enough history to be useful as a default indicator, as they were ªrst issued in the 1990s. Simply relying on sovereign risks to determine a ªrm's rating, without carefully analyzing the ªrm-speciªc credit risk, can be misleading. There have been cases in which the information disclosure on ªrms was poor, but GCRAs assigned ratings based on the assumption that the state was an implicit guarantor. This perceived government guarantee was the basis for assigning ratings to these companies that were inconsistent with their actual ªnancial performance and management quality.
The new Basel accord on bank capital asset requirements, which was ªnalized at the end of 2001, promotes risk scoring and external ratings issued by rating agencies and will thereby make the role of rating agencies even more important. The new Basel capital accord modulates capital asset requirements according to whether the borrowers to which the banks have made loans are rated and, if they are, according to the level of their ratings. Thus, developing countries may be disadvantaged in two ways. First, because ratings are generally lower and less widespread in developing countries, their capital requirements, and hence the cost of credit, may increase irrespective of corporate proªtability. Second, if private ratings in developing countries are excessively sensitive to their respective sovereign ratings, the impact of an excessive sovereign downgrading might be ampliªed by the criteria of the new Basel accord.
Estimation framework
Using corporate performance indicators to explain rating is not a novel approach, and empirical studies examining rating consistency using such indicators have been extensive. According to Ederington (1985) , a small set of ªnancial statistics (the ratios of interest coverage, proªtability, leverage, and asset size) can predict approximately two-thirds of the ratings issued by GCRAs. The fact that ªnancial indicators alone do not fully predict ratings should not be a surprise. 13 Other studies show that credit ratings do disclose to the market information beyond that contained in the ªrm's ªnancial ratios, but whether this additional information is useful depends on the timeliness of the credit reviews by the rating agencies (Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts 1987) .
Existing studies generally focus on the accuracy of the ratings assigned by the rating agencies. Though differentiated by sector, the samples of ªrms in these studies are drawn from the same macroeconomic environment, typically the United States. Thus, an important factor that affects individual ªrm ratings, such as the sovereign risk, is not considered in the analysis. This approach is not valid for the evaluation of diverse ªrms from different countries and regions. Rather than emphasizing the exclusive role of ªnancial indicators in predicting credit ratings, our approach allows for the fact that ªnancial indicators can predict only a large part of ªrms' idiosyncratic risks. A ªrm's rating is also inºuenced by the environment in which the 40 Asian Economic Papers Global Credit-Rating Agencies explained discordant pairs are so numerous that ªnancial indicators alone cannot predict ratings (i.e., analysts also base the ratings on subjective judgments). Analyzing Moody's ratings of the strength of the banking sector, Laruccia and Revoltella (2000) and Poon, Firth, and Fung (1999) validate the ªnancial indicator approach in predicting rating consistency and accuracy but ªnd that unexplained factors also have a bearing. ªrm operates (i.e., its overall industrial, institutional, and macroeconomic environment). We explore the relationship between sovereign and ªrm ratings, which has not been investigated before, and also compare the degree to which sovereign risk is a factor in the process of assigning an individual ªrm's credit rating. Furthermore, we attempt to explain why there tends to be a disparity across developed and developing countries in the relative importance of ªrm-level information to a ªrm's rating assignment.
We assume that, to make proªts and to generate future business, a credit-rating agency attempts to assign a value to a ªrm's risk and to predict default as accurately as possible. This motivation can be formalized by minimizing the squared distance between a ªrm's true risk, R it t , and its assigned ªrm rating, R it f . (The subscripts of these variables refer to the ith ªrm in period t. The superscripts are t ϭ true and f ϭ assigned.) The rating agency's utility function can be expressed as follows:
where R it t consists of two components: one is related to the ªrm's idiosyncratic risks (or credit risk), and the other is related to the overall macroeconomic risk, as captured by the sovereign risk, R it s . R it t is formulated as follows: 
where R it c is the ªrm's idiosyncratic risk, R it s is the aggregate risk of the country in which the ªrm is located, and α and β are the weights assigned to these two types of risk, respectively.
We will assume that the aggregate country risk can be fully captured by the sovereign risk rating. We will also assume that R it c can be decomposed as follows:
where R it q summarizes quantitative rating criteria, R it l summarizes qualitative rating criteria, and is the weight assigned to the quantitative rating criteria. Thus, the rating agency's detailed utility function, U it , can be rewritten as
Maximizing the utility function with respect to the rating agency's rating (R it f ), we obtain the following ªrst-order condition:
where λ ϭ αη and µ ϭ α(1 Ϫ η).
In order to determine the relative importance of R it q , R it l , and R it s (their contribution weights) in the rating assigned to the ªrm, we normalize the coefªcients of these variables by imposing a constraint, ␤ = − − 1 . Thus, the estimation equation can be rewritten as follows:
Unlike the ªrm's quantiªable rating criteria and sovereign risk ratings, R it l (which captures the qualitative rating criteria) is not observable. Following a procedure similar to that proposed by Levitt (1996) , we rewrite equation (6) using an indicator variable notation:
where I it represents ªrm-speciªc dummies. The empirical estimation of this equation requires a large panel data set.
Because we only have cross-sectional data averaged over 3 years for 543 ªrms from 45 countries, however, we will add the assumption that ªnancial indicators contain both qualitative and quantitative assessments of rated ªrms by rating agencies. Accordingly, the actual econometric speciªcation, after differentiating the contribution made by ªrm and sovereign credit risks at the country grouping level (i.e., DCs versus LDCs), is
where R i ql is the estimated ªrm's rating, which is supposed to contain both qualitative and quantitative information about the ªrm. The coefªcients intend to capture the expected contribution to the corporate ratings of both ªrm ( 1 DC and 2 LDC ) and sovereign (␤ 1 DC and ␤ 2 LDC ) credit risks in ªrms operating in DCs and LDCs.
Data used in the empirical estimation
Our data set consists of information from S&P's credit statistics on 563 ªrms from 45 countries. We exclude U.S. ªrms from the sample because of their large number and homogeneous economic environment. In addition, we use only long-term issuers' ratings, to avoid inconsistency arising from different types of issues. Our data set consists of information on ratings as well as a set of 3-year ªnancial performance indicators averaged over 1997 to 1999. Table 3 presents the distribution of countries and the number of ªrms in the countries represented in the data sample. Close to a quarter of the ªrms are from LDCs.
A summary of the statistics used in the determination of the ratings in the data set is presented in table 4. A comparison of the ªnancial performance indicators of our data set with those of the U.S. ªrms presented in table 2 is revealing. For ªrms rated between A and AAA, the interest rate coverage ratios (as measured by EBIT and EBITDA interest coverage) are in general lower for our sample than for U.S. ªrms. Return on capital and operating income margin, which are measures of ªrm efªciency, are also lower for the ªrms in our data set than they are for the U.S. ªrms, and so is the total debt, a measure of the debt leverage ratio. This suggests that the U.S. ªrms are more efªciently run than the ªrms in our sample. Speculatively speaking, this result could be attributable to more-developed capital markets in the United States and to more competition in the goods markets of the United States. Table 5 shows that ªrms from emerging market economies in our sample are rated BBB or below. This is largely because the majority of the sovereign ratings in these countries are also BBB or below. Compared with other ªrms in the sample, ªrms from LDCs are more proªtable than OECD ªrms, as measured by their high returns on capital. They are also efªciently run, as indicated by their operating income as a share of their sales. In addition, contrary to the commonly held perception about debt levels in emerging market ªrms, the leverage ratios for the emerging economies in our sample are lower than those of other ªrms within the same rating categories.
To enable us to make our empirical estimation, we converted S&P's alphanumeric ratings into numeric ratings on a scale of 0-100 as follows: AAA ϭ 100, AAϩ ϭ 95, Table 6 presents the results of a stepwise regression used to determine the statistical relationship between the actual ratings assigned to ªrms by S&P's and a set of ªnancial indicators. Column I of table 6 reports that the coefªcients of EBITINT (the interest coverage ratio), ROC (the return on capital), OPERINC (the ratio of operating income to sales), DEBTRATIO (the debt leverage ratio), and TOTASSETS (the total assets) are all statistically signiªcant and also have the expected signs. A ªrm's liquidity (EBITINT), proªtability (ROC, OPERINC), and size (TOTASSETS) are positively related to ratings, whereas the debt leverage ratio (DEBTRATIO) is negatively related to ªrm ratings.
Empirical results

Idiosyncratic risks versus sovereign risks
Column II of table 6 reveals that ownership variables and some sector dummies also affect ªrms' ratings. The ownership variables that affect ratings are GOVTOWNER (a dummy taking a value of 1 for ªrms owned by the government) and SUBSIDI-ARY (a dummy taking a value of 1 for subsidiaries of foreign companies). The sector dummies that affect ratings are AUTO (auto industry dummy), FOREST (paper and forest industry dummy), HOME (home building and civil engineering dummy), MEDIA (media industry dummy), and METALS (metal and mining industry dummy). We shall use the coefªcients reported in column II of table 6 to generate an estimated rating for each sample ªrm to proxy the ªrm's "revealed" credit risks Table 7 shows the respective contributions of the estimated ªrm rating and the sovereign rating of the country to the actual ªrm rating. We take logs of the sovereign and ªrm ratings, so that the coefªcient for each factor's contribution can be interpreted as elasticity. We separate the ªrms according to whether they are located in OECD economies or not. Columns I and II in 
2SLS: Mapping
columns III and IV present the results from two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimations. Because of the strong possibility of endogeneity in the regressors, the OLS estimations are theoretically inferior to the 2SLS estimations. The results in columns I and II should therefore be regarded as "preliminary and speculative," and the results in columns III and IV should be regarded as "preferred and deªnitive."
The results presented in column I (the meaning of "no mapping" will be explained in section 5.2) show the relationship between a ªrm's actual rating and its corresponding ªrm credit risk and sovereign risk. The dependent variable is the average actual ªrm rating (AVGFRAT). The regressors are created from (1) the estimated average ªrm ratings generated from table 6, which we label EFRAT; and (2) the average sovereign ratings (SRAT), the NONOECD dummy taking a value of 1 for countries that belong to the developing-country group and taking a value of 0 otherwise. OECDEFRAT is the result of multiplying EFRAT with the OECD dummy, which takes a value of 1 for OECD countries and 0 for non-OECD countries.
NONOECDEFRAT is obtained by multiplying EFRAT with the NONOECD dummy, which is 1 Ϫ OECD. OECDSRAT and NONOECDSRAT are the results of multiplying the actual average sovereign rating by the OECD and NONOECD dummies, respectively.
The results of the estimation reveal that, as expected, ªrm credit risks play a major role in determining actual credit ratings for ªrms in OECD countries. A 1 percent increase in OECDEFRAT raises an OECD ªrm's actual rating by 1.26 percentage points. The sovereign risks of an OECD ªrm may be disregarded, because OECDSRAT is not statistically signiªcant. In contrast, the contribution of ªrm credit risks to the actual credit rating of a non-OECD ªrm is much smaller. A 1 percent increase in NONOECDEFRAT increases the non-OECD ªrm's actual rating by only 0.51 percentage points. In fact, the sovereign risk is particularly important for the rating of a non-OECD ªrm. A 1 percent increase in NONOECDSRAT boosts the actual rating of a non-OECD ªrm by 0.62 percentage points.
The effect of the country ceiling
It is possible, however, that the strong effect of the sovereign rating on the rating of ªrms in LDCs could stem from the country ceiling effect, that is, from private ratings in general being constrained by an upper bound that is deªned by their sovereign rating. This poses a problem for us because the estimated ªrm rating is computed using, for each country, the coefªcients in column II of table 6. In that ªrst-step regression, we had constrained the values of the coefªcients to be the same for OECD and NONOECD countries, even though we suspect that this need not be so in the actual behavior of rating agencies. This constraint is necessary to allow us to run the second-step regressions (reported in table 7) and to compute the relative contributions of ªrm risk and sovereign risk. In fact, some of the estimated ªrm ratings exceed the sovereign ratings in 21 of the 45 countries in our sample, a result that is not observed in actual ªrm ratings. The 19 "developing" countries (mostly non-OECD countries) are Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Greece, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. The two developed countries are the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
In view of this discrepancy, we adjusted the estimated ratings in these 19 countries by mapping their distribution so that the maximum rating would just coincide with the sovereign rating. The mapping was done as follows: (1) for each country i, let
For the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which had i Ͼ 1 but had sovereign ratings of 100 (i.e., AAA), we adjusted only the single outlier to 100. The only two negative realizations of EFRAT (one for a Canadian ªrm and one for an Israeli ªrm) were adjusted to 5 because it corresponds with the minimum alphabetic rating scale, D.
Column II in table 7 is the case in which ADJEFRAT replaces EFRAT (i.e., in which EFRAT has been mapped into ADJEFRAT). OECDADJEFRAT is obtained by multiplying ADJEFRAT by OECD. NONOECDADJEFRAT is obtained by multiplying ADJEFRAT by NONOECD. Although there are no changes for the contribution of ªrm risks to the rating, the contributions of sovereign risks change signiªcantly. OECDSTRAT, which has a negative coefªcient, is now statistically signiªcant, whereas NONOECDSTRAT is now statistically insigniªcant. We speculate that the negative relationship between the sovereign ratings and ªrm ratings in OECD countries could indicate the self-selection mechanism whereby even less-well-performing ªrms in OECD found it advantageous to be rated and hence to be able to tap the ªnancial market in developed countries.
To check that our results in columns I and II are not driven by the endogeneity of the regressors, we re-estimated these two speciªcations using two-stage least squares. The instruments employed are GDP per capita, rule-of-law index, total trade as a measure of openness (see Frankel and Romer 1999) , distance from the equator, and some sector dummies. Except for the sector dummies, they are all in log form. To test the robustness of the instruments, we also examined their correlation with the regressors. These instruments are highly correlated with the regressors, and the rationale for using these variables is motivated by the recent literature on economic openness, institution quality, and economic development (e.g., Hall and Jones 1999; Frankel and Romer 1999) . The results of these re-estimations of the speciªcations in columns I and II are reported in columns III and IV of table 7, respectively.
The results in columns III and IV differ from those in columns I and II in two important dimensions. First, the coefªcient for the ªrm risk is never signiªcant for the non-OECD ªrms (NONOECDEFRAT and NONOECDADJEFRAT show elasticities of 0.22 and Ϫ0.08), whereas this coefªcient remains stable and signiªcant for the OECD ªrms (OECDEFRAT and OECDADJEFRAT show elasticities of 1.31 and 1.48, respectively). Second, sovereign risks always constitute the major factor in the ratings of ªrms in the non-OECD countries. NONOECDSRAT has an elasticity of 0.75 and 1.26 in the no-mapping and mapping speciªcations, respectively. Arguably, the results may be sensitive to the instrumental variables used and should not be taken wholly literally: the important point is that our qualitative results from 2SLS estimations are robust across speciªcations, whereas those from OLS estimations are not.
Discussion
The fundamental question is why do GCRAs generally fail to give the performance indicators of ªrms in LDCs a weight that is comparable to that normally given to such indicators for ªrms in DCs? To our knowledge, the theoretical literature has not provided satisfactory explanations for this speciªc problem. We present two possible explanations: one hinges on the industrial structure of GCRAs, and the other stems from the perverse incentives in the framework within which GCRAs and investors repeatedly interact.
The ªrst explanation has two parts. The ªrst part is that the GCRA industry is characterized by low or nonexistent competition. Accordingly, we can assume that GCRAs (at least jointly, but possibly even on an individual basis) enjoy nonnegligible market power. This would allow rent extraction by GCRAs from the entities being rated, which may explain the ªnding in White (2001) that bond rating is quite proªtable. This distributive problem is not the important point, however, because in addition to extracting excessive rents, a GCRA enjoying market power could also indulge in underinvesting, which is clearly a source of inefªciency. If GCRAs, in fact, invest less than the socially optimal amount in collecting and processing information on rated entities, the quality of the ratings they issue will be suboptimal and may become even less reliable over time. In other words, market power provides GCRAs with the incentive to underinvest in information collection and processing.
The second part of the ªrst explanation is that the GCRAs' underinvestment problem is more acute for LDCs than for DCs because most of the customers (both related entities and investors) and the authorities to which the GCRAs would respond are based in DCs and not in LDCs. The outcome is that GCRAs invest less in collecting and processing idiosyncratic information of ªrms in LCDs.
The second explanation for why GCRAs neglect ªrm-speciªc information in LDCs comes from the possible existence of perverse incentives in LCDs within a repeated strategic interaction framework between GCRAs and investors. Bernheim (1994) , Loury (1994) , and Morris (2001) provide models to explain why the conveying of information among parties is often governed by conformity. Speciªcally, party A will not necessarily tell party B what party A knows or thinks; this is because party A will communicate only the information that it believes will build the reputation that is required for interaction with party B. Extrapolating from this literature, we propose the following possible explanation for GCRAs' unsatisfactory rating assignment in LDCs. Suppose investors in DCs are somewhat negatively prejudiced with respect to the performance prospects of ªrms in LDCs. If the rating agency were to issue a strong positive signal on an LDC ªrm by granting it a rating above its sovereign rating, this would indeed be a powerful signal for investors. However, if the rating agency wants to maintain its reputation for being conservative, it is unlikely to grant a high rating. Since the rating agency cannot be certain that the LDC ªrm will actually outperform, it is not optimal for the rating agency to take the risk of losing its reputation. According to this reasoning, although the rating agency often knows that the rated LDC ªrm is very good, it will have the incentive to ensure that the issued rating conforms to the negative prejudice held by investors in DCs.
Information quality and ªrm-rating quality across countries
We know that the quality and reliability of information on corporations varies widely across countries. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether the smaller information content of the ratings of ªrms in LDCs (compared with those in DCs) simply reºects the poor quality or the low amount of ªrm-level data in these countries. There are indeed many differences between emerging and mature capital markets; but one key difference between the two concerns information disclosure as well as the enforcement of information disclosure, which is largely governed by the enforcement of the rule of law. If rating agencies cannot trust the information published by ªrms in developing countries, they may tend either to discount such information or to rely on benchmark information such as sovereign and macroeconomic information, which is compiled in a consistent framework and published by international organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank. If GCRAs consider sovereign information to be more reliable than ªrm-level data, this view might explain why the contribution of sovereign risk in ªrms' ratings is so high for ªrms from developing countries. The hypothesis to test is that the rating pattern can be explained by the quality of institutions and the quality of the information in the country to which the ªrms belong. Table 8 presents the relationship between institutional quality and the "tightness" between ªrm and sovereign ratings. This tightness is measured as the standard deviation of the difference between a ªrm's actual rating and its corresponding sovereign rating (STDEVACT). As previously observed, for ªrms in developing countries, the two ratings are closely linked, whereas the ªrm and sovereign ratings of ªrms in developed countries can diverge. Thus, the standard deviation of the difference between the ªrm and sovereign ratings tends to be much smaller in developing countries than in developed ones. The second measure of "tightness" between the ªrm and sovereign ratings is the ratio of the standard deviation of the difference between the two ratings and the level of the sovereign rating (STDEVSORAT). Indeed, both measures of the closeness between the ªrm and sovereign risks can be well explained by the rule-of-law index (LAW) developed by Transparency International The results indicate that the higher the rule-of-law index, the greater the difference between the ªrm and sovereign ratings in OECD economies. This ªnding implies that, within OECD economies, institutional quality matters when ªrm ratings are concerned. For ªrms in non-OECD countries, however, there is a negative relationship between the rule-of-law or information quality index and the dispersion between the ªrm rating and sovereign rating. This result indicates that poorer information quality in LCDs is not the only explanation for the smaller dispersion of ªrm ratings from sovereign ratings in emerging economies.
Conclusions and policy implications
This paper sheds some light on the puzzling observation that the linkage between ªrm ratings and sovereign ratings differs widely in developed countries, whereas in developing countries a ªrm's rating is often tightly linked to (and limited by) the sovereign rating. We began by observing that the close relationship between ªrm and sovereign ratings in developing countries is nonexistent in developed countries. This naturally leads one to question the information content in the ªrm-rating assignment. Our results indicate, not surprisingly, that in developed countries individual ªrm credit risks account for almost all the information content of ªrm ratings. In contrast, in developing countries the ªrm ratings greatly rely on the sovereign risks, whereas individual ªrms' credit risks play a negligible role in assigning a credit rating. Examining the rationale behind such a pattern, we ªnd that the quality of institutions and the quality of information disclosure can partly explain this rating behavior, but these factors do not lead to a complete understanding of why the GCRAs' process of assigning ratings is different for ªrms in emerging economies than it is for ªrms in DCs.
Our results have three important policy implications. First, we demonstrate that ªrms in LDCs tend to be penalized because of their domicile, regardless of their proªtability and performance. Low ªrm ratings resulting from low sovereign ratings can mean high capital costs for ªrms in LDCs. For these ªrms to obtain favorable ratings, it is imperative to strengthen the enforcement of the rule of law in the countries in which these ªrms are located and improve the quality and the amount of information disclosed by these ªrms. Some concrete steps can be taken by LDCs in these areas: for example, the accounting standards of LDCs should be guided toward generally accepted accounting principles. Convergence toward better institutions, in turn, would also have a positive effect on the overall growth prospects of the LDCs. As recent literature on growth and institutions demonstrates, enhancement of institutional quality can cause economic growth (Hall and Jones 1999) . Here, the channel of causality would run from better information disclosure to higher probability of getting a favorable rating and, therefore, of securing a lower cost of capital, which in turn would increase growth in developing countries.
A second implication for policy is that, given the unsatisfactory ratings on emerging economies at present, any international regulations linked to ratings are likely to have different effects in DCs and LDCs. In LDCs, it would be desirable to devise incentives for GCRAs to improve their rating regimes. International ªnancial institutions might also participate in this process of upgrading the quality of private ratings worldwide. In addition, upgrading domestic rating agencies would strengthen their comparative advantage, which is a ªrsthand knowledge of their own markets. Furthermore, improving local rating agencies would help increase competition with GCRAs and would thereby increase the incentive for GCRAs to invest more in information gathering within LDCs.
The third policy implication is that mechanisms that would help guarantee a reliable rating by a reputable credit bureau for well-run ªrms in developing countries (or measures that would make credit available to such ªrms by multinational institutions, such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) could greatly improve the quality of ratings and reduce the cost of capital in LDCs. This would be especially useful during cyclical downturns or during temporary liquidity and balance sheet crises caused by a sharp currency depreciation. In the face of adverse domestic economic cycles in LDCs, such guarantees would help reputable and viable ªrms maintain access to international capital markets, which would help them stay aºoat and thereby help reduce the severity of such cyclical downturns. 
